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The idea of equality, and even the word equality, exercises great moral
and political force, but it is a notoriously protean idea. Equality can mean
many things, many of them in tension with one another or utterly contradictory
to each other. Nonetheless, a Lockean idea of equality has predominated
in American political thought, and—imperfectly, like any ideal put into
human practice—in American life throughout most of American history.
The Lockean idea of equality is roughly that human beings have equal
natural rights to life, liberty, and property: with the implication that political
society should ensure these rights through the impartial rule of law, with
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equality of civil opportunity, but without venturing to ensure equal or
identical outcomes in life.
To be sure, there are counter-traditions in American history. The socialist
movement, which had more than negligible strength early in the twentieth
century, called for more equality of outcome, or at least less inequality
of material condition. Earlier, in the decades leading up to the civil war,
there were defenders of southern slave society who rejected the Lockean
idea entirely, denied that human beings are naturally free or have equal
natural rights, and denounced free labour and free markets as cruel, heartless,
and wanting in the patriarchal kindness of the southern slave system. 1
(George Fitzhugh, a leading ante-bellum writer in this vein, was a great
favourite of the Marxist historian Eugene Genovese, for obvious—if arguably
somewhat perverse–Marxist reasons.)2
In the immediate aftermath of what might be called the American civil
rights era, or even the civil rights revolution, of the early to mid-1960s,
and with the resurgence of egalitarian radicalism which rocked America
and much of the Western world in the later 1960s, there arose an academic
movement, associated prominently with the names of John Rawls, Ronald
Dworkin, and later Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, though by no means
limited to them, offering egalitarian theories that sought to meld or synthesise
greater equality of outcomes with the Lockean or Enlightenment ideas of
individual liberty, equality of opportunity, and equality before the law. These
theories won considerable attention and adherence in academic circles, although
the degree to which they resonated off campus might be questioned. They
certainly represented an attempt—admirable from many points of view—
to preserve and enhance the best of Lockean or classical liberal ideas and
social achievements with a vision of greater equality of resources, happiness,
or human outcomes.
At roughly the same time that these theories were developed, there
germinated—also, originally, in academic circles—a very different idea
of equality. Under the portmanteau name of “critical theory”, this idea, or
congeries of ideas, was more preoccupied with group equality, and what
it considered the oppression of victim groups, than with individual inequalities.
Critical theory, in its various guises, tended to repudiate, and often vehemently
to denounce, Lockean or Enlightenment values of individual and civil

1. See Edmund Wilson, PATRIOTIC GORE: STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE OF THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 341–64 (1966) (on George Fitzhugh as an “important apologist”
for slavery).
2. See e.g., Eugene Genovese, THE WORLD THE S LAVEHOLDERS M ADE : TWO
ESSAYS IN INTERPRETATION (1971) (arguing that Fitzhugh’s critique of market capitalism,
free society, and “wage slavery”, in defence of the Southern slave system, was the logical
ideological outcome of the Southern “seigneurial” system).
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liberty, equality of opportunity, and the impartial rule of law. All these,
and more, in the view of much critical theory, are mere masks for oppression
and racism, and ripe candidates for cancellation.
Unlike the theories associated with Rawls, Dworkin, Sen, and Nussbaum,
critical theory, especially in the guise of “critical race theory” has gained
wide—though sharply contested—public adherence or ascendancy, not
only among college and university students and faculty, but in the public
elementary and secondary schools (and in many private ones), in corporate
bureaucracies and in the media, and in federal and state government agencies
and bureaucracies. The claims, and even the jargon, associated with critical
race theory are also making themselves felt, and arousing controversy, beyond
the United States, especially—although perhaps almost exclusively—in
Anglosphere countries such as Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
With the spread of critical theory among people—and institutions—
who proclaim egalitarianism, the theories associated with Rawls and Dworkin
seem increasingly dated and almost quaint: relics of a bygone ideological
era.
It seems worth reviewing these once-honoured theories, at least briefly;
to ask whether or to what extent they succeeded or failed in their own
terms; and to compare them to the critical movements which now promise
or threaten to sweep the country (and perhaps a few other countries as
well).
I. ENLIGHTENMENT ANTECEDENTS
No two people are exactly alike: in that sense, none is equal to another.
Yet all share points in common. At a minimum, all people are people: to
that extent at least, they are equal. Whatever the ways people might be
equal or unequal, they can be treated equally or unequally in a wide variety
of different ways. They might receive equal respect, or equal rights at law,
or equal opportunities to distinguish themselves, or equal property and
other resources, or they might be promised equal welfare and happiness.
Equality might be reckoned by individuals, or it might be by groups. There
might be absolute equality: the same for everyone, regardless of what is
thought to be deserved or otherwise proper. Or equality might be proportional:
the same for everyone according to some scale of what is deserved or
otherwise proper.
These different kinds of equality, it is fairly obvious, can often be mutually
exclusive. Equal opportunity to distinguish oneself amounts to an equal
opportunity to become unequal. Equal rights for people whose skills or
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whose luck is unequal may ensure unequal possession of property and
other human resources. To ensure equality of possessions, conversely,
may require unequal rights, by way of equalizing or “handicapping” people
with unequal abilities. Equal possessions are liable to mean unequal welfare
and happiness for people with different needs, tastes, and personality
types; equal welfare may require unequal resources. Individual equality,
at least of some kinds such as equality of opportunity, is very apt to mean
group inequality, since groups—almost however defined—will have differing
distributions of skills, ambition, and luck.
Equality, in truth, might mean almost anything. Yet equality is a powerful
social and political ideal in the modern—and post-modern—world.
The seventeenth and eighteenth century Enlightenment was the most
important source for modern ideals of equality. For Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau, men are equal in the state of nature. Hume, echoing Diderot
and Adam Smith, wrote that all mankind are “much the same in all times
and places.” 3 The American Declaration of Independence, the great
political document of the Enlightenment, proclaimed the self-evident truth
that all men are created equal. The French Revolutionaries proclaimed
égalité and claimed the mantle of the Enlightenment, as—with perhaps
partial justification—did the nineteenth- and twentieth-century socialist
movements.
If equality was a central Enlightenment idea, what sort of equality,
among the myriad conflicting possibilities, was meant? As an intellectual
and social movement, the Enlightenment arose to repudiate what it saw as
the backwardness, superstition, and intolerance of mediaeval Christianity,
and the frozen, hierarchical society of mediaeval Christendom. The
Enlightenment rejected the idea that a person’s worth, identity, and destiny
should be overwhelmingly bound up in birth and kinship. In Sir Henry
Maine’s later expression, the Enlightenment sought to move away from
the “society of status.”4
Instead, the Enlightenment thinkers put a high value on the individual,
endowed as a person with natural rights. The supreme natural right is the
right to pursue happiness, each person in his or her own way, according
to each person’s own faculties. Natural rights attach to every person, regardless
of birth. As such, they are equal rights.
But for the Enlightenment, including the American founders, this meant
equal rights before the law. It did not mean equal outcomes in life. On the
contrary, life’s happiest outcome is to achieve enlightened reason, and the
3. David Hume, INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 93 (C. W. Hendel
ed., 1955).
4. Henry Maine, ANCIENT LAW 141 (reprint ed. 1986—1st ed. 1861) (“the movement
of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract”).
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Enlightenment accepted that people’s capacities for this are unequal.
Moreover, trying to ensure equal human happiness would mean that
people could not pursue their own ideas of happiness: there would have
to be a collectively imposed definition of happiness in order to administer
an equal distribution of it.
As for any idea of equal wealth or resources, the American founders
followed Locke in emphasizing the right to property as a fundamental human
right, with the recognition that property rights inevitably mean differences
in wealth.5 For these Enlightenment thinkers, property rights were important
in at least two ways: first, they encourage industriousness and hence promote
prosperity; and second, they afford each person a practical opportunity to
pursue personal goals, a personal idea of happiness, independent of any
collective orthodoxy about what constitutes a good life. (The paradigm
orthodoxy, of course, was that of the Church, against which the Enlightenment
defined itself in the first place.) The characteristic social ideal of the
Enlightenment was the carrière ouverte aux talents: equal opportunity to
pursue various (and hence unequal) careers, for unequal rewards, without
legal disabilities founded on irrelevant accidents of birth.6
A great strength of the Enlightenment idea of civic equality, or equality
before the law, is that it allows for a large measure of personal freedom.
All freedoms, after all, entail the freedom to differentiate oneself from others:
no freedom is needed to conform to the prevailing orthodoxy. Hence the
close link throughout American history, emphasized by Alexis de Tocqueville,
between this particular idea of equality and the idea of individual liberty
embodied in the Bill of Rights.
The Enlightenment idea of equality, which has been so influential in
American history, at least up to now, has surely been attractive to many
people over the generations and continues to be today, in America and elsewhere.
But there is a perennial undercurrent, or counter-current, of dissatisfaction
with it—a dissatisfaction which lies near the heart of much nineteenthand twentieth-century radicalism, now seeming to gain momentum in the
twenty-first century. In fact, the Enlightenment idea of equality itself carries
5. See generally John Locke, Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning
the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
(Gutenberg edition 2012, orig. 1690): https://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370h.htm [https://perma.cc/54E3-M2NR].
6. See Barry E. O’Meara, 1 N APOLEON AT S T H ELENA 105 (1888) (quoting
Napoleon as having coined the actual phrase “la carrière ouverte aux talents” in speaking
to Dr O’Meara in exile on St Helena).
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the seeds of many of the political and philosophical objections raised against
it.
There are at least two important objections. First, equality of rights does
not prevent—to some extent it promotes—great inequality of condition.
But the very success of the Enlightenment rejection of feudal inequality
of birth creates a sensitivity to inequalities of other kinds. Equality of
rights implies equal dignity for every person, which inequality of condition
seems to mock. If all people were not of equal dignity, after all, why
should they have equal rights? Yet it seems a fiction to claim that there
really is equal dignity for the rich and the poor, the happy and the miserable,
those with access to the best of everything and those without. Modern life
abounds in individual and group inequalities of resources, success, and
happiness. Unease with these inequalities is encouraged both by the wide
popular acceptance of the Enlightenment proclamation of equality and by
the ambiguity of what that proclamation might mean. Once it is accepted
as a self-evident truth that all men are created equal, and without some
degree of care or pedantry about what is intended, there is a natural recoil
from glaring human inequalities of any kind.
Second, there is a double edge to the association between equality of
rights and the idea of freedom. As has been noted, equality of rights respects
the inequality of outcomes that liberty produces, whereas to keep people
equal in their condition would require curtailing or suppressing the liberties
that people would exercise to differentiate themselves if they were free to
do so. The trouble is that equal rights cannot be exercised equally— sometimes,
if conditions are bad enough, they can scarcely be exercised at all—by
people of greatly unequal condition. Just as it can be jeered that “the law
in its majesty forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges,” so freedom
of speech, for example, is not the same for the owners of a tech platform
or a social medium as it is for the rest of us. Likewise, the Enlightenment’s
fundamental egalitarian idea of careers open to talent gives an obvious
unequal advantage to those with greater talents.
One possible response to these concerns is to suggest that liberty and
civil equality before the law on the one hand, and equality of outcome, wealth,
or happiness—or at least less inequality of these—on the other, are simply
alternative or competing values or sets of values, and that they can be
compromised, as competing values typically can be, by choosing or voting
to have less of one in order to have more of the other.
The academic movement associated with the names of Rawls, Ronald
Dworkin, and Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen was in a sense more
ambitious. These writers put forward, each in somewhat different form,
the claim that civil liberty and a high degree of equality of social or economic
condition—guaranteed or enforced by state power—are actually fully
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compatible with each other, entail little or no trade-off, and should be
thought of as part and parcel of the same greater good.
II. RAWLS
John Rawls’s book A Theory of Justice appeared in 1971. Philosophically
sophisticated and complex, it drew on Kantian concepts to put forth its
claim that economic egalitarianism is consistent with individual liberty,
and perhaps essential to it.
Rawls argues that justice requires two principles:
1.
2.

Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme
of liberties for all.7
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions.
First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they
must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members
of society.8

The first principle is very close to the Enlightenment idea of natural
rights and equality before the law. The second principle (known as the
“difference principle”) adds a requirement that there should be considerable
(but not necessarily total) equality of property and other resources for all
individuals, presumably—although Rawls is not clear about this— throughout
their lives. Inequalities are justified only as incentives or rewards which
promote such increases in the society’s wealth that actually make the
poorest better off.
Rawls derives these principles from a hypothetical social contract.
Suppose that a group of people meet to lay the framework for their society,
and that they are behind a “veil of ignorance” as to what individual places
each will have in that society. They do not know their race, sex, social
class, talents, personal characteristics, or ideas of what makes for a good
life. Rawls argues that they would adopt his principles in order to ensure
that, when the “veil” is lifted, even the worst positions in society are as
7. John Rawls, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 291 (1993); for an earlier and slightly different
formulation, see John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 250 (1971).
8. John Rawls, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 291. For a very slightly
different formulation, see John Rawls, JUSTICE AS F AIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 42–43
(2001).
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good as possible, and that all will be able to exercise their “moral powers”
to pursue their ideas of a good life, whatever those ideas might turn out to
be.
Much of the appeal of Rawls’s theory comes from the way it links
equality to liberty. Rawls insists, in fact, on the “lexical priority” of liberty,
by which he means that liberty must not be exchanged for other economic
or social advantages, including greater equality.9 In Rawls’s social contract,
equality is esteemed not for its own sake, but so that all persons will have
the best practical opportunity to exercise their freedoms in pursuit of their
individual ideas of the good life. Thus, Rawls’s equality principle avows
its adherence to Enlightenment ideas about liberty, individual autonomy,
and the supreme worth of the individual, while appealing to the egalitarian
ethic which the Enlightenment may have fostered in modern men and
women.
Actually, it is not clear how much equality of economic outcome is
really required by Rawls’s “difference principle.” If inequality of resources
could only be justified insofar as it improves the position of the single
worst-off individual in society, then practically no inequality at all could
be justified, since the life of a truly dysfunctional derelict, say, might not
be improved by any net improvement in the wealth of society. Rawls
therefore suggests that inequalities are justified if they improve the lot of
a representative member of the least advantaged class.10 But then the size
of that class is crucial. If by the “least advantaged class” one means the poorer
50 percent of society, say, then great inequalities might be justified: the
poorer 50 percent of Americans are very probably better off now on
average than they would be in a society with significantly fewer incentives
for the creation of national wealth. Yet Rawls surely implies that he intends
something close to equality of property and other resources as his governing
principle of distributive justice.
An objection frequently raised against Rawls’s scheme is that his parable
of the social contract assumes great risk-aversion on the part of those behind
the “veil of ignorance.” He pictures them agreeing to forbid inequalities
of economic outcome that do not benefit the least advantaged (or the least
advantaged class), because any of them might turn out to be the least
advantaged when the “veil” is lifted. But suppose in a society with more
inequality, and more incentive to produce wealth, many people—perhaps
most people—would be better off (although the worst off would be worse
off) than they would be in a society where property is equal. Might people
not wish to risk greater inequality—the possibility of being among the few

9.
10.
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who would be worse off than otherwise—in hopes of being among the
many who would be better off?
This objection has implications that go beyond the niceties of social
contract theory. The stated goal of Rawls’s theory of justice is that everyone
should be enabled to pursue an individual idea of the good life. For many
intellectuals, and perhaps for many religious people, that pursuit might be
a matter of adhering to a particular theory, cause, or faith. But for many
non-intellectuals, economic activity is the grist of daily life, and the idea
of a good life is bound up with achieving economic distinction for oneself
and one’s family. Yet economic distinction means economic inequality,
and much of it might be forbidden by Rawls’s theory of justice.
The question of risk-aversion suggests that even behind the veil of ignorance,
there might be no consensus for Rawls’s principles. And once the veil is
lifted, talented, lucky, or ambitious people might surely chafe. It is not clear
how a notional agreement “behind the veil” would compel actual agreement
in real life. In the absence of such agreement, a society intent upon Rawls’s
equality principle might have to use considerable compulsion in order to
maintain it. Rawls insists that his theory gives “lexical priority” to liberty,
even over equality. But a society really intent on equality—persuaded, perhaps,
that if people stand out too much in their attitudes, outlook, or ideas, that
they are apt to try to stand out economically as well—might relegate freedom
to a priority that is “lexical” in the other sense: merely verbal or nominal,
and only to be honoured in the breach.
III. DWORKIN
Ronald Dworkin was a lawyer and philosopher, and probably the
leading intellectual heir to Rawls. He derived his egalitarianism not from
any parable of a social contract, but rather from an ethical theory that would
judge people by how they meet the ethical challenges they set themselves
in life.11 Since all are equal in having to face such challenges, justice
requires that they should have equal resources with which to face them.
Moreover, ethics are apt to be frustrated by unjust circumstances, so each
person’s ethical life is best led under conditions of justice, with equal
resources for all. Freedom is essential for such equality, because to define
equal resources in a complex world, and to allocate them fairly, there must
11. See generally Ronald Dworkin, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EQUALITY (2000); see also Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality in 11
TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 1 (1990).
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be ongoing freedom of discussion; likewise, people must have liberty to
develop their ideas of a good life in order for resources appropriate to
those ideas to be distributed equally.
Equality of resources, for Dworkin, means that people’s unequal talents
and luck should not be permitted to produce inequalities of wealth.
Dworkin is more radical than Rawls about this, inasmuch as he would not
even tolerate inequalities that improve the condition of the worst off. On
the other hand, Dworkin accepts that once everyone has received an equal
initial bundle of resources, those people who choose to engage in valuable
activities ought to be entitled to acquire and to keep what others are prepared
to pay—so long as the ensuing inequality is the result of a person’s choice
of occupation and hard work, rather than a result of unequal talent or luck.
And Dworkin calls for equality of resources, but not for a government effort
to create equal welfare or happiness, because on his ethical model people
ought to be responsible for pursuing their own, autonomous ideas of welfare.12
Dworkin does not propose that people’s talents and luck should actually
be made identical—that those favoured by birth should be forced to undergo
physical or mental amputation of some kind. Instead, he envisions an
insurance scheme, carried out in practice by redistributive taxation, which
would compensate for inequalities of luck and ability. The goal would be
to compensate for handicaps, but not for expensive tastes or other moral
choices, whose consequences a person should rightly live with on Dworkin’s
“challenge model” of ethics.13
One objection to this is that it is difficult to know where handicaps, talents,
and luck might end and where matters of moral choice begin. If one is
conditioned by one’s upbringing to choose a valuable occupation and to
work hard at it, is that one’s luck or one’s moral choice? And if handicaps
are difficult to distinguish from expensive tastes and other personal choices,
an egalitarian society might be driven towards a policy of compensating
for expensive tastes as well as for handicaps, which tends to convert the
principle of equality of resources into a policy of trying to ensure equal
welfare or happiness for all.
A deeper objection is that equality of resources might not really promote
Dworkin’s goals of ethical autonomy and responsibility. Dworkin’s argument
is that equal resources give people the best chance to choose (and to try to
meet) their own individual ethical challenges in life. But darker possibilities
suggest themselves. Perhaps many people would not feel they can afford
to be ethical individualists in conditions of general poverty: and in a society
12. Dworkin, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 11, at 65–119; Dworkin, Foundations,
supra note 11, at 93–98.
13. Dworkin, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 11, at 48–62; Dworkin, Foundations,
supra note 11, at 90.
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that enforces equality of resources there would be little incentive to create
wealth and hence, it is fair to predict, little wealth. (There is evidence,
surely, that ethical attention to human rights is greater in affluent countries
than in poor ones.) Then again, there is the danger that when society
enforces a sameness of resources or conditions, it may foster a human
sameness as well—a climate of conformity and lack of imagination.
People might be most apt to develop independent ethical ideals where
there is wide human diversity, and there tends to be wider human diversity
when human conditions differ, not when they are the same. Still another
possibility is that, far from promoting ethical responsibility, a society that
ensures equal resources might create a sense that no urgent ethical obligations
remain, or that it no longer matters very much how any individual behaves.
Above all, it might be questioned how much liberty there could really
be in a society committed to Dworkin’s equality of resources. Unlike Rawls,
who says that equality is necessary for autonomy and freedom, Dworkin
suggests that freedom is valuable primarily because it is needed to achieve
justice, by which he means a genuinely equal distribution of resources.14
If freedom is not valuable for its own sake, but only as a means towards
equality, it is not clear why there should be freedom for people who do not
believe that justice requires such equality, and who would use their freedom
to speak and work against equality of resources.
IV. EQUALITY OF CAPABILITIES: AMARTYA SEN AND
MARTHA NUSSBAUM
Amartya Sen is an economist and philosopher; Martha Nussbaum is a
classicist and philosopher; both have a strong liberal egalitarian bent. Sen
and Nussbaum urge an egalitarianism of capabilities: that society should
ensure that each person has the capability to exercise freedom effectively
and to achieve the “functionings” or the goals which the person considers
valuable.15 This approach is explicitly put forward as an alternative both
to equality of welfare and equality of resources. A liberal society cannot
and should not ensure equality of welfare, because to do so it would have
to define what welfare is for everybody, preempting people from choosing
for themselves among a variety of different and conflicting values and
14.
15.

Dworkin, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 11, at 120–23,
See generally Martha Nussbaum, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY,
S PECIES M EMBERSHIP (2006); Martha Nussbaum, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT :
THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000); Amartya Sen, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992).
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goals in life. But equality of resources would not have equal value for
people who differ widely in their natural and social situations: equal resources
would not mean real equality, for example, for people with physical, mental,
or social handicaps.16
Sen is somewhat abstract about what particular capabilities society
should ensure to each person, although he alludes to Franklin Roosevelt’s
“four freedoms”—including freedom from want and freedom from fear—
as being at least illustrative.17 Nussbaum lists ten central capabilities: life;
bodily health; bodily integrity, including freedom from assault and sexual
freedom; ability to exercise the senses, imagination, and thinking; emotional
development; practical reason, including freedom of conscience; affiliation
or relations with others; ability to live with concern for and in relation to
animals, plants, and nature; ability to play; and control over one’s political
and material environment.18
Both Sen and Nussbaum insist that people vary in their need for resources
in order to develop their capabilities, and that society should provide more
resources to those with physical, mental, or social handicaps. 19 Social
handicaps include obstacles created by traditional hierarchies and prejudice.
Redistribution, therefore, should include preferential treatment on the basis
of race, gender, and class.
Sen, on the other hand, concedes that extensive government redistribution
may conflict with promoting economic efficiency and productivity. Sen
suggests a need for compromise between market principles and redistribution,
and criticizes the “extremism” of Rawls’ principle that inequalities can
only be justified if they improve the condition of the worst off.20 Sen even
suggests that Rawls was driven by that principle to opt for mere equality
of “primary goods” or resources rather than a more meaningful equality
of capabilities, since the level of government intervention that would be
required to ensure the latter would be prohibitive if no countervailing
consideration of economic efficiency (beyond what would help the worst
off) could be taken into account.21
16. Sen, supra note 15, at 85–87; Nussbaum, WOMEN, supra note 15, at 99 (“Analysing
economic and material rights in terms of capabilities thus enables us to set forth clearly a
rationale we have for spending unequal amounts of money on the disadvantaged, or
creating special programs to assist their transition to full capability”.).
17. Sen, supra note 15, at 68–69.
18. Nussbaum, FRONTIERS, supra note 15, at 76–78; Nussbaum, WOMEN, supra note 15,
at 78–80.
19. Nussbaum, WOMEN, supra note 15 at 99; Sen, supra note 15, at 30 (urging us
not “to overlook the substantive inequalities in, say, well-being and freedom that may
directly result from an equal distribution of incomes (given our variable needs and disparate
personal and social circumstances)”).
20. Sen, supra note 15, at 146.
21. Id. at 145–46.
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A theoretical criticism of capability egalitarianism is that it may tend to
collapse either into equality of welfare or equality of resources rather than
being truly a “third way”. Sen and Nussbaum both emphasize that capabilities
and effective free choice are good in themselves, not just as means to
achieving other goods. But if capabilities are important goods—perhaps
among the most important goods in life—then redistribution intended
to equalize them is really an effort to equalize welfare. As for offering an
alternative to Rawls’ and Dworkin’s equality of resources, Dworkin himself
stipulates an insurance scheme to compensate for handicaps, so it is not
clear that capability egalitarianism (intended to compensate for physical
or social handicaps) is really any different in principle.
There are practical objections as well. Sen and Nussbaum insist that
people with natural and socially generated difficulties need and should
receive more resources than others in order to develop their capabilities.22
But no government could assess on an individual basis what each person
needs along these lines. So capability grants would have to be on a group
or category basis: a person would be eligible for preferential or affirmative
action redistribution depending on whether the person belongs to an eligible
group or category. The politics of victim group identity would appear to
follow inevitably, with intense competition among racial, ethnic, religious,
sexual, regional, class, and other groups, as well as groups based on physical
and mental conditions of various kinds, for who is needier, who is more
handicapped by “traditional hierarchy and prejudice”, and who will receive
bigger slices of the pie.
Moreover, government would have to grow considerably in size and
power in order to direct society’s economic resources towards promoting
a complex list of human capabilities, while trying to accommodate, if not
to suppress, controversy about the list. (“Concern for other species” does
not appear to contemplate a high priority for recreational hunting or fishing,
to take one example of a capability that might be contested.) It is at least
plausible that human capabilities flourish best, on average, in a more prosperous
society. Prosperity surely tends to offer more choice, not only of commodities,
but also of cultural and even spiritual resources. A significantly more politicized
economy and a larger, more powerful, more intrusive state would not
necessarily be conducive to prosperity. It is also fairly obvious that the
powers of such a state would tend to be in tension, or to put it more plainly,
in conflict with personal freedoms of many kinds, economic and otherwise.
22.

See e.g., id. at 148.
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Capability egalitarianism is perhaps most open to criticism for its want
of what the poet Keats called “negative capability”.23 Keats meant a kind
of humility about the limits of reason and analysis in the face of beauty
and the sublime. But in this context, what might be wanted is a degree of
humility about the limits of government. Capability egalitarianism, as mooted
by Sen and Nussbaum, would mean extensive state intrusion in the economy,
if not into the private life of each person whose capabilities are to be
promoted. There is at least a question whether such state policy would in
practice be benevolent, disinterested, or efficient.
V. CRITICAL THEORY—IN ACADEMIA AND BEYOND
The theories associated with Rawls, Dworkin, Nussbaum and Sen, and
others writing in a similar vein, may or may not be persuasive as to the
identity, or fundamental compatibility, of Enlightenment or Lockean liberty
and far-reaching egalitarianism of human outcome or condition. But they
were put forward with great intellectual and moral seriousness, in obvious
good faith, and might reasonably inspire—if one isn’t in the end persuaded
—a fugitive wish that they could somehow have succeeded.
Another stream of theory, broadly known as critical theory, perhaps
with roots in Frankfurt School neo-Marxist critical theory—or at least
claiming a kind of family resemblance to it—began to make an appearance
in American academia, and especially in the law schools, at about the same
time that Rawls’ and his successors’ writings were appearing. Post-1960s
academic critical theory took various forms, but it is fair to say that they
all, or virtually all, took a radical—and adverse—view of liberal institutions
and liberal values, with emphasis on deconstructing them, not (“merely”)
synthesizing or melding them with egalitarian ideas.24
Critical race theory is perhaps the most prominent and influential offshoot
of critical theory. Associated originally with the names of Derrick Bell,
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Cheryl Harris,
Patricia Williams, among others, its central idea is that racial subordination
is everywhere, a “structural” aspect of all parts of American history and
society.25 Accordingly, its concern is overwhelmingly with group rather
than individual equality or inequality: in particular, that all differences
23. John Keats, Letter to George and Thomas Keats, December 22, 1817, in THE
COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS AND LETTERS OF JOHN KEATS 277 (1899); see generally Ou
Li, KEATS AND NEGATIVE CAPABILITY (2009).
24. For a critical assessment of the foundations of critical theory, see Leszek Kolakowski,
The Frankfurt School and Critical Theory, in FOUNDATIONS OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL
OF SOCIAL RESEARCH (Judith Marcus & Zoltan Tar eds., 1984).
25. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds, 1995).
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between racial groups, especially all ways that minorities might be worse
off on average, should be attributed to racism and racial oppression.
The academic founders of critical race theory were fairly numerous, and
differed from each other on some subordinate points. Derrick Bell, for
example, seemed to reject law altogether, calling the civil rights laws and
decisions of the 1950s and 1960s mere instruments of white interests,
“bogus freedom checks”; whereas others suggest that the law can at least
sometimes be enlisted in Black or minority interests.26
But it was common ground for critical race theory that American
constitutional government, the Bill of Rights, neutral principles of law,
and the goal of government without regard to race or colour, are all instruments
of racial subordination and camouflages for white supremacy.27 As Richard
Delgado writes, critical race theory is “marked by a deep discontent with
liberalism, a system of civil rights litigation and activism characterized by
incrementalism, faith in the legal system, and hope for progress.”28 Or as
a critical observer of the critical race theorists observed more than twenty
years ago, “Critical race theories attack the very foundations of the liberal
legal order, including equality theory, legal reasoning, Enlightenment
rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law.”29
One preoccupation of academic critical race writing has been with
“story-telling”, specifically recounting racial offences or insults, with the
qualification that objectivity is neither desirable nor possible, and hence
that it is inappropriate to question whether a story of racial victimisation
is representative, significant, or even (“objectively”) true.30
But there were, and are, at least a few concrete legal or public policy
ideas insisted upon by the academic critical race theorists. One is opposition
26. Derrick Bell, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
18 (1992); but cf. Mari Matsuda et al., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 17–51 (1993) (urging that “hate speech”
against oppressed minorities—although not “verbal attacks upon dominant-group members by
victims”—should be unprotected by the First Amendment: a legal reform, after all,
whether or not a desirable one).
27. For a comprehensive review of critical race theory at the end of the 20th century,
see Jeffrey J. Pyle, Race, Equality and the Rule of Law: Critical Race Theory’s Attack on
the Promises of Liberalism, 40 B.C. L. REV.787 (1999).
28. Richard Delgado, Critique of Liberalism, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY : THE
CUTTING EDGE 7 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2013).
29. Pyle, supra note 27, at 788.
30. On “storytelling” in critical race theory, see Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the
Crits, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 8, 1996), https://newrepublic.com/article/74070/the-bloodsand-the-crits [https://perma.cc/9J4M-24ZP].
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to freedom of speech insofar as it protects the expression of ideas deemed
racially hateful. First Amendment protection of freedom of expression,
writes Richard Delgado, is now a “deeply mistaken” example of “neutralitybased jurisprudence” which “assure[s] that life’s victors continue winning”.31
Since in the view of critical race theory, racial oppression permeates American
institutions and history, the scope of racially hateful ideas, whose expression
should not be protected, is potentially rather wide. American colleges and
universities already began to impose sweeping “speech codes” in the
1980s, many of which would readily stretch to prohibiting the expression
of any idea, opinion, or fact that might offend the easily offended.32
An even more central legal or policy idea of critical race theory is its
rejection of equal opportunity, “colour-blindness”, or equality before the
law regardless of race. The integrationist goal of colour-blind constitutionalism,
wrote Neil Gotanda, “supports the supremacy of white interests and
therefore must be regarded as racist”.33 As with freedom of expression,
here too, critical race theory opposes “neutrality-based jurisprudence”. The
idea that government, the law, and the institutions of society should be
impartial as to race (and other group identities) would obviously conflict
with the racial (and other group) preferences that go under the banner of
affirmative action. Preferential treatment, in favour of some, and inevitably
against others, has become a way of life, even an article of faith, at American
colleges and universities: in student admissions, faculty hiring and promotion,
curriculum, and much else. This may explain, at least in part, the sway
and acceptance that critical race theory has achieved in the college and
university world.34
Critical race theory, however, at least in derivative form, is no longer
just a campus phenomenon. In recent years it has enjoyed, if that is the
word, a widespread breakthrough in American society and institutions.
Ideas and jargon derived from critical race theory are now commonplace,
for example, in corporate “diversity training”, itself an $8 billion industry
in the United States.35 This training, required of staff in many government

31. RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? AND OTHER APOCALYPTIC TALES
OF AMERICA AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND WELFARE 67 (1996).

32. See e.g., Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (1989) (holding a
public university’s speech code unconstitutional under the First Amendment: among the
code’s many examples of forbidden speech was “telling jokes about gay men and lesbians”).
33. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind”, in CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 257, 272.
34. For critical assessment of racial preferences on campus, see A DUBIOUS EXPEDIENCY:
H OW R ACIAL P REFERENCES D AMAGE H IGHER E DUCATION (Gail Heriot & Maimon
Schwarzschild eds., 2021).
35. See Focusing on What Works for Workplace Diversity, MCKINSEY & CO. (Apr.
2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/gender-equality/focusing-on-what-
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and corporate bureaucracies, routinely inculcates the idea of “unconscious”
or “implicit” bias, and demands apologies for “whiteness” and confessions of
inherent white racism.36
Critical race theory, or derivatives of it, is increasingly inculcated in
many elementary and secondary schools as well. The initiative by the New
York Times known as the 1619 Project, for example, promotes and funds
school lessons and curricula based on the idea that racism was central to
America from the very outset; that the American Revolution was only
fought in order to ensure that slavery would continue, and that practically
everything that followed—prominently including the career and presidency
of Abraham Lincoln—was irredeemably racist.37 Although the claims of
the 1619 Project have been refuted by eminent historians from across the
ideological spectrum, including scholars whose entire careers were on the
liberal or radical Left, many public and private schools around the country
have nevertheless adopted the 1619 Project or similar teaching plans.38
The National Education Association, America’s largest teachers’ union—
in fact, the largest labour union in the United States—publicly committed

works-for-workplace-diversity [https://perma.cc/D264-3B3Y] (“About $8 billion a year is
spent on diversity trainings in the United States alone.”).
36. For examples of corporate and academic “diversity training”, see Opinion No.
1 of Austin Knudsen, Attorney General of Montana 8–18 (May 27, 2021), https://media.
dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/AGO-V58-O1-5.27.21-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/BS6VGEWA]; For further examples, see Chritopher F. Rufo, Critical Race Theory in Education
(Apr. 27, 2021), https://christopherrufo.com/critical-race-theory-in-education/ [https://
perma.cc/P6PK-32UX].
37. The 1619 Project, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.html; but cf. New York Times Quietly
Edits “1619 Project” After Conservative Pushback, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Sept. 26,
2020) (“Sections of the online publication were scrubbed of controversial language without
even an editor’s note to explain the changes”), https://www.heritage.org/american-founders/
impact/new-york-times-quietly-edits-1619-project-after-conservative-pushback; For elaborate
curricula introducing the 1619 Project into the schools, see e.g., The 1619 Project Curriculum,
Pulitzer Center (including model curricula, lesson plans, video lectures, and much else):
https://pulitzercenter.org/lesson-plan-grouping/1619-project-curriculum [https://perma.cc/
75QL-J47R].
38. For a rebuttal to the 1619 Project, see e.g. Letter to the Editor: We Respond to
the Historians Who Critiqued the 1619 project, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2019) (“We are
dismayed at some of the factual errors in the project and the closed process behind it. . .
They suggest a displacement of historical understanding by ideology”). See also David
North & Eric London, The 1619 Project and the Falsification of History: An Analysis of
the New York Times’ Reply to Five Historians, WORLD SOCIALIST WEBSITE (Dec. 28, 2019)
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2019/12/28/nytr-d28.html [https://perma.cc/257D-E4G2].
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itself to promoting critical race theory at its annual meeting in July 2021.39
In many classrooms, critical race tenets are not presented as one point of
view, contested by other ideas and interpretations, with pupils being taught
to think independently and to develop skills of critical thinking and the
evaluation of evidence. On the contrary, there is now widespread evidence that
many “anti-racism” curricula use psychological techniques to “train”
pupils that their race determines nearly everything about them. Any objection
to being deemed privileged and to being held personally responsible for
white racism is ridiculed as “white fragility” and a discredited defence of
whiteness.40
Erosion of free expression, or “cancel culture”, again consistently with
critical race theory, is also widespread in America now, well beyond the
precincts of the one-party campus. A Rasmussen poll in December 2018
found that only 26 percent of American adults believe they have real
freedom of speech, whereas 68 percent think they now have to be careful
not to say something “politically incorrect” that might get them into trouble,
possibly threatening their livelihoods or even their physical safety.41
All this surely represents a challenge, not only intellectually but also
socially and institutionally, to the values of a liberal society.
VI. CONCLUSION
The idea that liberty—or in the American context, liberal constitutionalism—
and far-reaching egalitarianism of outcome or condition are one and the
same, or fundamentally compatible, may be difficult to sustain. It isn’t
clear that Rawls and his successors, with the best will in the world, were
able to sustain it.
This is not to imply that these values cannot be compromised. A
provisional or ad hoc compromise among competing or conflicting values
39. See New Business Item 39, National Education Association, Annual Meeting
& Representative Assembly, June 30 - July 3, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/2021070
5090534/https://ra.nea.org/business-item/2021-nbi-039/ [https://perma.cc/H6UU-7D4M]
(undertaking, among other commitments, to “[p]rovide an already-created, in-depth, study
that critiques empire, white supremacy, anti-Blackness, anti-Indigeneity, racism, patriarchy,
cisheteropatriarchy, capitalism, ableism, anthropocentrism, and other forms of power and
oppression at the intersections of our society, and that we oppose attempts to ban critical
race theory and/or The 1619 Project.”).
40. See Opinion No. 1 of Austin Knudsen, supra note 36, for documented examples
of classroom “anti-racism” lessons and techniques.
41. See Few Think They Have True Freedom of Speech Today, RASMUSSEN REP.
(Dec. 12, 2018), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/lifestyle/general_lifestyle/
december_2018/few_think_they_have_true_freedom_of_speech_today [https://perma.cc/
VU6A-FZEP]. See also Andrew Michta, The Rise of Unfreedom in the West, THE AMERICAN
INTEREST (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2019/03/19/the-riseof-unfreedom-in-the-west/ [https://perma.cc/GX8N-BMSE].
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is almost always possible, it being understood that this entails trade-offs,
with more of one meaning less of the other.
The writings of Rawls and his avowedly liberal successors aroused
considerable academic interest, at least for a time, and may still do so,
albeit with diminishing prominence and a diminishing sense of being at
the heart of things academically. But beyond the academic world, the
writings of Rawls and his successors aroused limited interest and had
limited cultural resonance. As such, they did not, as a practical matter,
put American—or any other—society to a choice about whether, or to what
extent, to adopt the ideas, policies, or laws that these writers advocated.
By contrast, the ideas associated with critical theory, and critical race
theory in particular, are now prominent, and in many cases perhaps predominant,
on American college and university campuses. And these ideas, or fairly
direct offshoots of them, are also insistently promoted in many other
institutions and spheres of American life: in government and corporate
bureaucracies, in elementary and secondary schools, in the media, even in
entertainment and professional sport.
Critical race theory, and the “anti-racism” and social justice campaigns
it inspires, do not, for the most part, propose a synthesis or melding of
liberal or Enlightenment values with individual or even with group
egalitarianism. On the contrary, critical race theorists in the academy, and
many activists beyond the campus world, forthrightly reject liberal values.
The impartial rule of law; civil liberty—including freedom of expression,
freedom of thought, and freedom of religion; property rights and any
substantial degree of economic freedom: all these are commonly and often
vociferously repudiated in principle, or castigated as sham or mere
camouflage for racism.
Moreover, perhaps the central liberal idea or ideal is the unique value
of the individual human person, endowed with civic rights, and morally
autonomous and accountable. Critical race theory, and especially many
of its derivatives—in the corporate “diversity training” industry, in the
“anti-racist” school curricula, and beyond—are preoccupied instead with
group identity, group culpability, and group entitlement. “Whiteness” is
presented as cause for shame and guilt, with others deemed victimised and
oppressed by reason of birth and identity. All this reinforces group
differences and antipathies, and encourages an ever more tribal, divided,
and mutually mistrustful society. To the extent that it expresses a vision
of equality, it is not—certainly not primarily—a vision of individual equality,
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even of wealth or of outcome in life, but rather a vision of identitygroup equality or proportional representation.
Unlike the avowedly liberal egalitarianism of Rawls and his successors,
critical race theory and its derivatives have reached what might be called
a critical mass: they are now a social and institutional force to be reckoned
with, well beyond the precincts of the colleges and universities. As such,
they may, as a practical matter, put American society—and perhaps a few
other societies—to a choice. The choice, if so, is between a broadly liberal
regime, seeking—inevitably imperfectly—to respect the autonomy and
civic equality of the individual, upheld by the impartial rule of law, and
tempered by a degree of social provision, mediated through a democratic
process. Or alternatively, the choice might be for a far more illiberal
regime, with an ideal of group equality: a society dominated or defined,
at least in substantial part, by identity-group grievance and racial division,
with ongoing demands for reparation and preferential treatment. To the
extent that these are the alternatives, the choice will truly be a basic one
for the character of American society going forward.
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